Leonas Pausch
Edited by Evan Burgess
As NATO's leaders gathered in Washington to celebrate what President Joe Biden hailed as “the greatest military alliance in the history of the world,” the mood was far from jubilant.[1] Marking 75 years of peacekeeping on the European continent, the alliance now faces a series of daunting challenges. Russia appears to be gaining ground in Ukraine, and internally, NATO might soon need to re-acclimate to the presence of Donald Trump. While the Cold War’s stark two-block system may be a thing of the past, Vladimir Putin has maintained robust ties with China, Iran, and North Korea since the war's outset. This new “axis of upheaval”[2] is a mutual support club: Iran sends drones to Russia, Moscow reciprocates with advanced weaponry to Tehran, and a recent lavish summit between Kim Jong-un and Putin in Pyongyang culminated in a strategic partnership, the export of North Korean artillery and ballistic missiles, and a stark warning aimed at South Korea.[3] Most troubling for NATO analysts is the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. Since 2014, Chinese military supplies have been vital to Russia's military-industrial complex, with Beijing underpinning the Russian war economy as its most important trading partner and “decisive enabler”.[4] As Putin forges alliances with like-minded Asian powers, European security increasingly hinges on an Eurasian dimension. In light of these developments, it was no surprise that NATO's anniversary included the four American Indo-Pacific partners. Leaders from New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and South Korea were invited for the third consecutive year to the summit and their interests are reciprocal. Kishida, the prime minister of Japan, rightfully pointed out that “what´s happening in Ukraine today, may well be happening in East Asia tomorrow.”[5]
Pax Isolationista?
In the American psyche, the notion of "Pax Americana"—the U.S. as the world's policeman—still holds, albeit in a reversed manner. During the Cold War, Republicans were the staunchest advocates of American dominance. However, the 21st century has seen a seismic shift in party lines: blue-collar workers have gravitated towards the Republicans, while college-educated citizens have increasingly voted Democrat.[6] By closely tying economic angst and cultural unease to the perceived threats of globalization—cue the familiar refrain of “immigrants taking our jobs”[7]—Donald Trump successfully fused nativist grievances with broader U.S. foreign policy concerns. His rhetoric, peppered with references to “DEI hires” and "bad trade deals," skilfully melded domestic discontent with international anxieties, creating a potent narrative that resonated with many Americans who felt left behind. This transformation has infused Republican rhetoric with right-wing populism, clearly moving away from once bold foreign policies of Ronald Reagan or the Bushes and towards isolationism. When conflict erupted in Gaza, the GOP swiftly blamed President Biden, asserting such events wouldn't have occurred under Trump[8]—a claim echoed with the Ukraine conflict, which Trump boasted he could end without setting foot in the Oval Office.[9] Equally starry-eyed were both Asian and European allies who assumed that, while American dominance might wane, the U.S. would still shield them from bellicose neighbours.
Reality has shifted. Over the past twenty years, the U.S. government has more than doubled its fiscal deficit and the military struggles to meet recruitment targets, making the U.S. army the smallest since 1940, while public enthusiasm for US engagement diminishes.[10] Although Biden proudly noted he is the first U.S. president in the 21st century under whom the country hasn't been engaged in war,[11] polls indicate a majority of republicans and independents now believe that “US interests are better served by using our resources to improve life for ordinary Americans at home” rather than “by supporting freedom and democracy around the world when they are under threat.”[12] This isolationist sentiment has also manifested in legislative action, with Republicans recently delaying a major Ukraine aid package from passing the Congress floor.
But since the turn of the century, the U.S. has lost millions of jobs, particularly in manufacturing, at least partly because of China’s growing role in the world economy. Since the 2008 financial crisis, 1.7 million jobs have gone, according to the Economic Policy Institute, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington, D.C., which largely blames China’s admission into the World Trade Organization for the loss.
Former President Donald Trump has praised Putin as a “genius” and criticized Ukraine for corruption and supposed interference in U.S. elections. As a result, isolationist sentiment has become resurgent in the far right of the Republican party. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, only 12 percent of Republicans expressed a “very favorable” opinion of NATO; among Democrats, the figure was 34 percent. 85 percent of Republicans consider “protecting American jobs” the top foreign policy priority as compared to 67 percent of Democrats.
To be sure, his populist appeal rested on more than an attack on US foreign policy. He also tapped into widespread anger over the economic dislocations caused by globalization and the post-2008 Great Recession, and exploited polarizing cultural changes related to race, the role of women, and gender identity. But by blaming economic problems on “bad trade deals with countries like Mexico and China and on immigrants competing for jobs,” Trump successfully linked nativist resentment to US foreign policy.
The Trump Effect
Trump’s first term already damaged the security constellation around China and Japan. By ditching the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, veering between confrontation and appeasement with North Korea, and palling around with the world’s dictators, Trump eroded trust in US protection. Japan especially drew lessons from this, counterintuitively growing closer to the US by putting their alliance on a more institutional footing – hoping to make the alliance more costly to break - , while at the same time strengthening their own capabilities and expanding ties with other partners. In March 2024, the US and Japan outlined what was described as the “biggest upgrade to their security alliance” to counter China.[13] This overhaul included enhanced command and control frameworks for seamless integration and a focus on interoperability. Japan recently supplied surface-to-air missiles to the US for Ukraine, and in December 2023, agreed to ship Japanese-made Patriot missiles to replenish American stockpiles—marking a significant shift from its post-war pacifist stance and easing its ban on lethal weapon exports. Meanwhile, Japan also increased defence spending to 1.6% (a significant rise from decades of sub-1% expenditure) and established a central command station for the Self-Defence Forces in 2018.[14] By 2027, Japan’s defence budget is projected to be 65% higher than in 2022. They further seek closer ties to the other members of the Quad – India, Australia and South Korea – as well as other partners in the region like the Philippines. For example, India and Japan conducted joint fighter aircraft exercises for the first time in January 2023 to strengthen bilateral cooperation.
A similar dynamic is shaping European security policy across the Siberian plain. One of the rare silver linings European policymakers drew from the tumultuous Trump presidency was the "Trump shock," which jolted the European military and defence sector out of their American-induced lethargy.[15] Initially met with consternation, this wake-up call proved timely as the Ukraine conflict loomed. At Trump's inauguration, only Latvia, Greece, the US, and the UK met the NATO 2% defence spending target. Fast forward to today, 23 countries, led by Germany's Zeitenwende, have risen to the challenge. A second Trump term might hike this target to 3%, harking back to Cold War levels where Britain spent up to 5.8% of GDP on defence, France 5.1%, and West Germany 3.6%. To return to such heights would demand Herculean efforts: an additional $124 billion annually for the UK, $97 billion for France, and $96 billion for Germany.[16] While the newfound drive towards strategic autonomy and the shift from NATO to the EU as a security actor are beneficial for the continent in an increasingly contested international arena, building sufficient capacity remains a distant goal—at least a decade away.
From Frenemies to Strategic Bedfellows
To bridge the capacity gap, a strategic partnership between the EU and East Asian allies—particularly Japan—is becoming more imperative. In the 1980s, the EU viewed Japan primarily as an economic rival, at best a "friend of a friend" through the US.[17] Today, however, Japan stands as one of the EU's closest allies. The Trump presidency accelerated this shift, pushing Japan and the EU to find their own voices and see each other as “old friends.” Now, they join forces on maritime security missions like EU NAVFOR to safeguard sea routes off Somalia and engage in cybersecurity dialogues through initiatives like the Cyber Dialogue and ICT Policy Dialogue.[18] The 2018 Strategic Partnership Agreement further cemented their collaboration. For the EU, playing an active role in the Indo-Pacific region is a strategic necessity, given its broader neighbourhood and critical security interests. Both the EU and Japan are keen to keep the Indo-Pacific region peaceful and accessible to all, building on a “rules-based international order” to secure one of the world's most crucial shipping lanes in the South China Sea.[19] Beyond traditional military and regional security, EU-Japan economic collaboration is further developing. Japan needs to maintain strong relations with their third-largest trading partner and Japan is the EU´s second-largest trading partner in Asia. President Trump’s anti-global trade and multilateralism position specifically reshaped this EU-Japan cooperation.
Yet, doubts linger. The EU has been sluggish in developing its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), while Japan still sees the EU as lacking the military prowess or political will to be a serious security partner. Strengthening NATO-IP4 ties risks escalating tensions with China and Russia, who might see this as a containment strategy, and could push North Korea closer to them. The EU, wary of this perception and the significance of Chinese exports, tries to maintain a fruitful relationship with China and keeps neutral e.g., on the China-Japan maritime dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.[20] Indeed, for the EU “tensions” are counterproductive in the region while it is the “greatest strategic challenge” for Japan.[21] Differences between the US and the EU already surface regarding membership in the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, the financial arm of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); while most EU states have joined, the US and Japan have stayed out. The perceived lack of EU military muscle and its neutral political position contribute to what Tsuruoka dubs the ‘expectation gap’ in Japan-EU relations.[22] Meanwhile, renewed Russian aggression in Ukraine or other Eastern European states may divert European attention and resources to localized engagements, potentially deterring efforts to secure stability in Asia and support Japanese security. Japan is acutely aware that currently in a crisis, it wouldn’t be the EU – especially post-Brexit with diminished capabilities in East Asia – coming to the rescue, but the US.
Looking ahead, the future of EU-Japan strategic partnership appears promising and increasingly necessary. If the EU develops closer ties between its member states and Japan increases its efforts to build defence relations with other Indo-Pacific actors, like South Korea, Australia or the Philippines, both actors reduce the potential risk of US disengagement. A steadfast Washington would find in a transformed EU and Japan more robust and indispensable allies. Conversely, should the U.S. abandon its role as global arbiter—whether under Trump or any future president—these strategic shifts would better equip Tokyo and fortify the EU’s strategic position. By building close strategic ties between the Indo-Pacific and Europe, Japan and the EU could start to decouple the American power and go strengthened in a multipolar world.
[1] Biden, Joe. Statement from President Joe Biden on NATO’s 75th Anniversary. The White House, 4th April 2024.
[2] Kendall-Taylor, Andrea. The Axis of Upheaval: How the Convergence of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea Will Challenge the US and Europe. International Centre for Defense and Security, 29th May 2024.
[3] Howell, Edward. Kim–Putin ‘strategic partnership’ leaves US and allies with multi-pronged problem. Chatham House, 21st. June 2024.
[4] McCarthy, Simone. NATO allies call China a ‘decisive enabler’ of Russia in Ukraine war as bloc eyes Asia security threats. CNN, 11th July 2024.
[5] Fumio, Kishida. Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference. The White House, 10th April 2024.
[6] DeSmith, Christy. Why so many blue-collar workers drifted away from Democratic Party. The Harvard Gazette, 26th October 2023.
[7] Trump, Donald. Campaign Speech in Phoenix, Arizona. 11th July 2015.
[8] Wolf, Zachary. How Republicans are trying to blame Biden for the attacks on Israel. CNN, 9th October 2024.
[9] Kennedy, Niamh and Hansler, Jennifer. Trump ready to be ‘peace broker’ on Ukraine, Orban tells skeptical European leaders. CNN, 16th July 2024.
[10] Congressional Research Service. The 2024 Army Force Structure Transformation Initiative. CRS Report, 30th April 2024.
[11] Biden, Joe. Remarks by President Biden in Statement to the American People. The White House, 24th July 2024.
[12] Lord Ashcroft. My latest US polling – and what it means on Ukraine. Lord Ashcroft Polls, 5th December 2023. Pew Report. Majority of Americans Confident in Biden’s Handling of Foreign Policy as Term Begins. Pew Research Center, 24th February 2021.
[13] Sevastopulo, Demetri and Inagaki, Kana. US and Japan plan biggest upgrade to security pact in over 60 years. FT, 24th March 2024.
[14] Johnson, Jesse. Japan ups defense spending to 1.6% of GDP with eye on 2027 goal. The Japan Times, 29th April 2024.
[15] Garton Ash, Timothy. As Putin and Trump threaten from east and west, Europe must stand up for itself. The Guardian, 6th February, 2024.
[16] Ferguson, Niall. The US and Europe Risk Flunking Geopolitics 101. Bloomberg, 1st February 2024.
[17] Kirchner, Emil and Dorussen, Han. New horizons in EU–Japan security cooperation. Asia Europe Journal, 16th July 2020.
[18] EEAS. Boosting EU-Indo-Pacific Partnerships: Chair’s Press Release following the EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum. EEAS, 2nd February 2024.
[19] Talmon, Stefan. Germany Sends Warship to the South China Sea to Protect and Safeguard the Rules-Based International Order. GPIL, 28th March 2023.
[20] Grieger, Gisela. Sino-Japanese controversy over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands. EU Members Research Service, 21st July 2021.
[21] Tatsumi, Yuki et.al. Japan’s Strategic Future and Implications for the US-Japan Alliance. Stimson, 28th February 2024.
[22] Tsuruoka, Michito. Expectations deficit in EU-Japan relations: Why the relationship cannot flourish. Keio University, 2008.
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